Introduction
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the adoption of floating exchange rates by the major industrial countries in March 1973, it was widely believed that the new exchange system would allow each of these countries to insulate its money supply from foreign influences. The view that monetary independence was attainable may have encouraged some of the countries during the l970s to pursue a policy of monetary targeting -establishing a preannounced target growth rate, or band of growth rates, of some monetary aggregate.
Experience in the decade since floating exchange rates were adopted suggests that independence of national money supplies has not been achieved.' Moreover, a number of countries that adopted some form of mone- By late 1982, the problem of monetary control seemed so acute to the Bank of Canada that it abandoned money growth targets (see also figure ib, which shows the behavior of the money stock relative to the target level).
Another feature of the Canadian experience is that the regression for the short-run demand for --of the type used by the Bank of Canada -- exhibits exceptionally large residuals since 1979 that appear to resemble deviations of money growth from the target rates of growth (compare figures Ia and ic).
The Bank of Canada, like many central banks, has always used short-term interest rates as its principal mechanism in executing monetary policy.
According to the conventional view of interest rate control that appears to underlie the Bank's approach, the money stock would be determined by money demand, which the Bank can influence by setting an appropriate interest rate. This view suggests two explanations of the erratic behavior of the (through an interest rate policy reaction function) and then a negative effect on the money stock (through the money demand function). However, a problem with this explanation is that it implies a negative association between U.S. interest rates and Canadian money growth rather than the observed positive association.
A second explanation of the behavior of Canadian money growth ---one that the Bank of Canada itself has emphasized --is that the demand for 6 N1 in Canada has become less stable since 1979.
One reason suggested for the instability during this period is the impact of financial innovations, possibly induced by high interest rates.7 The instability in money demand could account for both large residuals in the demand equation as well as large fluctuations in money growth. However, this explanation does not account for the positive correlation between Canadian money growth and U.S. interest rates.
This paper proposes an alternative explanation of the triple incidence of money growth variability, the apparent money demand instability in Canada, and the positive dependence of Canadian money growth on U.S.
interest rates. Our explanation is related to two strands in the literature: (1) Brunner and Meltzer's credit market approach to the money supply process (19Th); and (2) the buffer stock view of money recently emphasized by Laidler (1984 our interpretation of the first factor differs from that of the Bank. In section III we present a framework of money growth under interest rate control that supplants the Bank's approach. We first develop a money supply process which highlights the role of the credit market and its sensitivity to foreign shocks as well as the Bank of Canada's intervention in the exchange market. We then discuss interaction between the money supply and money demand functions by incorporating the determinants of the money supply process into the short-run mechanism by which actual money balances adjust to desired money balances. Section IV presents evidence consistent with the money supply process we describe and supports the view that money supply disturbances, such as those produced by variability in foreign interest rates, exert an important influence on the short-run demand for money function. Section V summarizes the conclusions and implications of the paper.
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II. Money Growth Under Interest Rate Control: The Bank of Canada's Approach
The Bank's approach is based on the conventional view that interest rate control implies a money supply function which is perfectly interest elastic at the fixed interest rate, and that the stock of money is determined where the money demand function intersects the elastic supply function.9
According to this view, knowledge of the demand for money can he used to manipulate the interest rate in order to determine the behavior of the money stock. In this approach, the rate of money growth would deviate from the desired rate only to the extent that changes in money demand were unanticipated at the time the rate of interest was set. If the unanticipated changes are not large, interest rate control would be a viable method for money growth targeting in the sense that it would be technically feasible to keep money growth close to the target path. We discuss below how such a policy would he implemented and then examine to what extent the Bank has followed this policy.
An essential ingredient in the Bank's approach is an econometric estimate of the demand for money. Most of the empirical work on demand for Ml in Canada uses an equation which combines a long-run demand function with a real partial adjustment mechanism following Chow (1966) . A simple but representative form of the long-run demand function is
where m*, y and r represent logarithms of the desired real stock of money, real income, and the shortterm interest rate, respectively; u is the -6error term. Adding the Chow mechanism, we have = Xm
where m is the logarithm of the actual real stock of money.
The demand for money based on equations (1) and (2) can be rewiitten
where N and P are the logarithms of the nominal money stock and the price level.
Let Mt represent the logarithm of the mid-value of the target money stock announced for period t.'1 Let r be the interest rate that would make the expected value of Mt equal to M, According to the money demand function (3), r would satisfy
where P, ' and represent the forecasts of.P, y, and u, available to the Bank in period t.
When the Bank of Canada announced its targeting policy in 1975, it was assumed initially that the Bank would attempt to achieve its target by setting the interest rate at r in each period.'2 The Bank, however, made it clear later that money growth targets were not its sole concern and that it would be influenced by other considerations in determining the interest rate.'3 e special concern of the Bank has been preventing large noverients in the exchange rate. For this reason the Bank may have been reacting to the U.S. interest rate to avoid letting a substantial dif--7ferential develop between U.S. and Canadian interest rates.'4
To explore the Bank of Canada interest rate reaction function, we consider the following model:
ri = p(r* -ri) + Xtll + Vt, 0 < ii K 1.
where r* is the "desired" rate of interest in the long run, rus the U.S.
interest rate. X a vector representing other oblectives (II a corresponding vector of coefficients) and v an error term. The above model allows for the possibility that the desired long-run rate may equal (0 = 1), rus (0 = 0), or a weighted average of the two rates. Moreover, the model permits the interest rate to be adjusted gradually towards the desired rate (p K 1) and for other objectives (included in X) to play a role in the short-run determination of the interest rate.
To estimate the model, we developed a measure of r as follows.
First, the demand function for Canadian M1, based on (1) and (2), was estimated for the floating exchange rate period, 1970111-19831, using quarterly data; OLSQ estimates of the function are presented in row 1 of Table 1 .
(As significant serial correlation of the error term is not indicated, the Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment is not used.) Next, values of and y were generated from forecasting equations, developed according to a procedure suggested by Mishkin (1983) .16 Then r was calculated according to (4). Making use of the above measure of r, we estinated an int:erestrate reaction function for the Bank of Canada, based on (5) where D is a dummy variable for the targeting period (equal to 1 for 1975111-1982111, equal to zero in the remaining period)., and t-values are shown below the coefficients.
The regression equation shows that although r has exerted some influence on the Canadian interest rate, the effect of the U.S. interest rate has been much stronger.2° The magnitude of the effect of the U.S. interest rate in the targeting period, moreover, has been less than but not significantly different from its effect in the nontarget period. The evidence suggests that the targeting policy had only a marginal influence on the Bank of Canada's reaction function.21
The reluctance of the Bank of Canada to follow a pure targeting strategy of setting r = r could account for the divergence of from Mt. Rowever, even if r had been set exactly equal to r in each period, the money stock could still have diverged from its target value because of errors in -9forecasting inflation and output, and unforeseen shifts in money demand.
To examine the relative importance of these factors, we subtracted (4) from (3) and let u 0 (based on the absence of serial correlation in our estimates of money demand) to get -= -) + Xa1(y-y) + X2(r-r) + Xu. According to these estimates, the deviation of r from r played an important role in causing the divergence of M from Mt. However, money demand residuals were also a major source of the divergence. This evidence would appear to support the Bank of Canada's explanation that its difficulties with controlling money growth have arisen from money demand instability.
We do not agree with this explanation. We present in the next section a framework alternative to the one the Bank has adopted that we believe is a more accurate analysis of the dynamics of interest rate control of money growth. In the fo].Iowing section we present an interpretation of the results from the. first regression in Table 1 that suggests that the observed residuals in the money demand regression reflect an inadeuacy in -10the conventional specification of the short-run adjustment mechanism rather than instability in the long run demand for money.
III. Money Supply and Demand Under Interest Rate Control: An Alternative View
In this section we first present a view of how the stock of money is determined under interest rate control that differs from the Bank's view, and then go on to discuss the interaction between money supply and demand.
Under interest rate control, the central bank attempts to fix the yield on (a certain class of) government securities by being ready to absorb any excess demand or supply at the fixed price. This policy amounts to making the supply of central bank domestic credit (assets of the central bank excluding international reserves) perfectly interest elastic. In addition, interest rate control generally provides commercial banks free access to reserves at a fixed interest rate.23 If banks can freely vary their reserves, commercial bank credit (assets pf banks excluding bank reserves) would also become perfectly interest elastic.24 In this case, the entire banking sector could be viewed as willing to accommodate the demand for domestic credit (defined as the sum Of commercial bank and central hank domestic credit) by the nonbanking public at the fixed rate.
A change in the demand for domestic credit would then automatically produce a change in the money supply as a result of the nonbanking public's transactions with the banking sector. A change in the demand for domestic credit, moreover, need not produce a matching change in money demand. Thus if, according to the buffer stock approach, the money market does not clear instantaneously, then the tock of money would not be demand-determined and the conventional view would he undermined. The view we present below is -11one in which the stock of money is determined largely by the demand for domestic credit.25
The demand for domestic credit depends on the rates of return on alternative assets.26 If these alternatives are very good substitutes for assets included in domestic credit, the demand for domestic credit would be sensitive to changes in rates of return on the substitutes and thus not likely to be very stable. Instability in the demand for domestic credit for this reason may produce considerable volatility in money supply under interest rate control.
For a country like Canada whose financial markets are well integrated with U.S. markets, movements in the foreign rate relative to the controlled domestic rate can trigger large changes in the demand for domestic credit.
To highlight the role of shifts between domestic and foreign securities, consider a simple framework which abstracts from differences in securities due to risk, term of maturity, and other characteristics. Assume that all interest-bearing assets take the form of a riskless one period bond. Let r and us represent the yields on domestic and U.S. bonds, respectively.
Also, let be the expected rate of change in the exchange rate (the price of U.s. dollars) so that rUS + 0 is the expected rate of return on the U.S.
bond (in terms of domestic currency). In this simple framework, domestic credit (DC) would equal (for simplicity, we omit the time subscripts from equations (9) through (13) below)
where B represents the total stock of domestic bonds and B° is the stock held by the nonbank public.
-12-As the money supply (MS) uld equal the sum of domestic credit and international reserves (IR), we can express the rate of money growth as27
Under interest rate control, ADC would equal the change in the demand for domestic credit. According to (9), moreover, the change in domestic credit would equal the difference between the change in the total supply of domestic bonds (SB) and that in the demand by the nonbank public (LB11).
While the flow of public and private borrowing would determine AB, shifts between domestic bonds and other assets, especially foreign bonds, would n affect AB
We present below a simple relationship explaining the change in domestic credit (divided by the money stock). Our purpose is to highlight the sensitivity of domestic credit to rates of return on domestic and foreign bonds. We expect an increase in rUS + to cause a shift from domestic to foreign bonds and induce the sale of domestic bonds to the banking sector by the nonbank public and thus lead to a decrease in B11.
Similarly, an increase in r would be expected to cause an increase in B11.
Assuming that AB1 dominates the behavior of ADC, we posit the following relationship: We thus consider an intervention function of the following form:
< ' 2 > where X is a vector (identical with that in the interest-rate reaction function (6)) representing other objective variables including the rate of change of the exchange rate, 2 a vector of coefficients, and w2 the error term in the relationship. Adding (11) and (12), we get the following 'money supply" function:
where w = w1 + w2. Although the conventional specification of short-run money demand includes a partial adjustment mechanism, the mechanism does not adequately represent the buffer stock view, The basic problem is that while the partial adjustment mechanism incorporates gradual adjustment in the desired real stock of money to changes in the arguments of money demand, it does 33 not allow for such adjustment in response to changes in money supply. Carr and Darby (1981) have suggested that money supply shocks (unanticipated money) should be included in the partial adjustment mechanism. One problem with that approach, however, is that even some anticipated money may be held temporarily if the price level does not adjust fully to anticipated changes. Another issue is that unanticipated money would be correlated with the residual in money demand, which would make it difficult to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the effect of money supply shocks.34
As an alternative approach, we introduce the determinants of the money supply function (13) into the partial adjustment mechanism and rewrite this mechanism as:
where z is an error term which we expect to be correlated with w, the error term in the money supply function. Note that has the same sign as K1 and 2 the same sign as K2.5
To examine the implications of the modified partial adjustment mechanism for the short-term demand for money, we combine (14) with (1) 
Ii = 1' 2 = + 2' 13 = ], 14 1 -A e = Xu + z.
As (15) 
In (16) (15). Thus, estmation of the shortshort-run money demand function would provide a clear-cut test of the presence of rUS and a on the supply side, regardless of whether the true form of the function is given by (15) or (17). If = 0, 13 = 0 in (15) while 37 13 0 and 0, according to (17).
IV.
Empirical Evidence on the Money Supply Process and the Short-Run
Demand for Money
In this section we present evidence on supply functions explaining money growth and its components, and on the short-run demand for money incorporating the modified partial adjustment mechanism.
Each equation is initially estimated, using OLS. To avoid simultaneous equation bias, the key equations are reestimated using a two-stage least squares procedure. The instruments used in this procedure were based on the model of the Bank's reaction function discussed in section II above.
One problem with estimating both the supply and demand functions for money is that no reliable measure of a is available. As a proxy for a, we used f-s where f and s denote, respectively, the logarithms of forward and spot exchange rates. As is well recognized, this rieasure would he subject to error in the presence of a risk premium. Thus, when using this -18measure, the coefficient of a was not constrained to be equal to that of r.38 other potential difficulty with the use of f-s along th r and rUS is that interest rate arbitrage would lead to a high degree of multicollinearity among these variables. This problem, however, was not severe in the data set we used. The simple correlation between r and (rUS + f-s)
was .91, and thus not very close to a perfect linear relationship.39 The results reported in table 1 support the view that supply-side con-20siderations matter in the adjustment mechanism. As the results show, rUS exerts a positive and significant effect on the real stock of money.
This evidence is inconsistent with the conventional closed-economy formulation in which r'5 would be absent from the money demand function. It is also inconsistent with the conventional open-economy variant where r would have a negative effect on the demand for money. The f-s variable which did not survive the two-stage money supply regression was also found not significant in the two-stage money demand regression. Finally, it is interesting to note that the introduction of rUS in the money demand regression increases the absolute value of the coefficient of r. In the two-stage regression, this coefficient is equal to -1.33. In the absence of supply side factors in the adjustment mechanism = 2 = 0), such a value would imply a long-run interest elasticity equal to -1.23 (at the average value of the interest rate over the the given period A second conclusion is that variability in money growth attributable to foreign shocks can easily be misinterpreted as instability in the demand for money. The reason for the misinterpretation is that the conventional specification of the short-run mechanism by which actual real money balances adjust to desired real money balances is inadequate. We argue in the paper that money supply disturbances should be included in the adjustment mechanism, and that these disturbances could account for apparent shifts in the demand for money.
A final conclusion is that use of an interest rate as the policy instrument is a mechanism that may be incompatible with the objective of stable money growth. The basic problem is that the demand function in the credit market is likely to be very sensitive to the differential between the rate the authorities set and the rate of return on close substitutes. The yields on domestic bonds would therefore rise to match the U.S.
interest rate, and money supply growth would be unaffected.
Again, under reserve control, the effect of exchange rate management on the money supply could be completely sterilized, but the Canadian interest rate would have to move to clear the credit market.46 In those circumstances, there would be no link between U.S. interest rates and Canadian money growth. With exchange market intervention not fully sterilized, reserve control would be weakened.
All things considered, in our judgment if the objective of the Canadian monetary authorities is to achieve control of the money supply process, the -23interest rate procedure is a self-defeating means. For an open economy, that procedure will heighten interdependence.
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APPENDIX: Data and Sources

D:
A dummy variable equal to 1 for the money targeting period 1975111-1982111, and zero for the remaining period. -26 -
Footnotes
'According to DeGrauwe and Fratianni (1984 , Table 5 ), for example, correlations of the average annual growth rates of Ml of 7 major countries increased in 1971-81 compared to 1960-70. Also see McKinnon (1982 McKinnon ( , 1984 , and Dornbusch and Fischer (1984 "Notwithstanding the contribution of monetary targeting in getting monetary policy to a better track, practical problems have emerged in Canada, and I expect other countries as well, which have reduced the usefulness of these targets as policy guides .Perhaps the most troublesome problem in Canada is that the relationship between our target monetary aggregate--N1---and the level of spending has not turned out to be as stable s it ppearc.d in fh micl-1970's" 7See e.g. Lucas (1984) .
8See Carr and Darby (1981) for a related shock-absorber view of money.
See also Judd and Scadding (1981) and White (1981) .
9See, for instance, White (1979) for such an interpretation.
'°See, for instance, Clinton (1973) , Gregory and Mackinnon (1980) , Poloz (1980) , Bordo and Choudhri (1982) .
The Bank actually announced target rates of growth measured with reference to a specified base period. it is possible, however, to calculate as follows: Mt = Mt_n ÷ gn, where M_ is the logarithm of the money stock in the base period t -n and g is the mid value of the announced target range.
'2See Parkin (1981) . Also see Courchene's (1979) discussion of the Bank's approach.
'3According to the Bank (1982a, p. 27) , "The Bank thus never regarded its Ml target system as some sort of automatic pilot for monetary policy.
In the short run it was something to be taken into account along with other considerations."
-
14Since the Bank of Canada believes that it "can exert a substantial degree of influence over interest rates at the short end of the maturity spectrum" (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1983, P. 100), in our empirical work we use a representative short-term interest rate --the sime rate that we use in the demand for money regressions below. Representative short-term rates include the Treasury bill rate, the rate on 90-day finance company paper, and the call money rate.
'5To test the possibility that postal strikes during this period had a significant impact on the demand for money, we reestimated the demand for money regressions with dummy variables for major postal strikes. Although some postal strike dummies were significant, they did not affect the results much. We have omitted them from the regression equations shown in the table to simplify the presentation. 18We assume that while the exchange rate is observed immediately, the information on the rates of inflation and unemployment becomes available to the Bank with a lag. The expected rates of inflation and unemployment, however, were estimated according to the procedure discussed in note 16
which assumes a one quarter information lag. As the actual information lag may have been shorter, we also introduced unexpected rates of these variables in the regression but found these to be insignificant.
-9Expected changes in the unemployment rate as well as the inflation rate were also tried but turned Out to be insignificant.
200ur measure of r would, of course, not be exactly the same as the r that the Bank may have utilized. In some respects, we may have assumed that too little information was available to the Bank, but in other respects, too much. Information lags, on the one hand, may be considerably less than one quarter, but on the other hand, the estimates of money demand that we used are based on the data for the whole period. It is also possible that rather than basing r on r, the Bank may have followed a policy simply of reacting to the last-period deviation of the money stock from its target value (see Courchene 1979) . In an alternative version of the reaction function, we replaced (r -ri) by (Mi -Mtl) but found that the latter target variable produced similar results.
21See also Gregory and Reynauld (1985) See Courchene (1976, pp. 11-31) .
24The term commercial bank credit is sometimes used to refer to bank loans. Here we do not emphasize the distinction between bank loans and other earning assets of commercial banks.
25See Laidler (1980) who refers to the conventional view as the moneymarket view and the alternative view as the credit-market view.
-31 -26Alternative assets refer to financial assets other than those included in the balance sheets of the consolidated banking sector. These alternatives would include equities and would represent foreign as well as domestic assets.
271n the empirical work discussed below, MS is defined as narrow money.
Tittie deposits are thus being aggregated with other interest-bearing assets.
28As our main concern is with the role of r and rUS + a in the domestic credit function, we did not explore, in our empirical estimation of (11) below, the possible influence of other variables such as an index of wealth. We did, however, consider the possibility that if the adjustment of actual 'to the desired stock of domestic credit is completed in each period, the change in the demand for domestic credit may depend on first differences rather than levels of the rates of return. We tried a domestic credit function with L(r'5 + a) and tr as the arguments, but found that this variant did not perform as well as (11) 33An alternative interpretation of the partial adjustment mechanism, suggested by Goodfriend (1984) , is that the mechanism could represent errors in the measurement of the arguments in the demand for money.
34See McKinnon and Milbourne (1984) . crrt iv P -I I -A disriissd in the next section, X variables in (13) did not turn out to be significant and thus we have not included them in (14).
36Note that the residuals in the regression equation in row 1 of table 1 would now represent not only e but also the effect of the omitted term us r +c.
37A positive effect of rS on m would also be implied by currencysubstitution models which assume r_rS to be a measure of . For instance, in the special case of perfect interest arbitrage and zero risk premium, rr'8 would exactly equal a. Substituting 0 = rru5 in (17) and rearranging, the coefficient of rUS would equal: -Xct, which would be positive with < 0. However, if there are departures from the above special case, the currency-substitution model can be discriminated from the supply-side effects by estimating the money demand function of the form (17), which includes a as well as r and In this form, the coefficient of r'8 must be negative or zero according to the currency-substitution model when the supply-side effect is absent. Also see note 38 below.
38Note that if f-s is a poor proxy for a because of the presence of the -33risk premium, (r_rUS) uld also be a poor proxy for . For instance, let f-s = ci+p, and r_rUS = f-s+c, where p is the risk premium and c represents.
departures from perfect interest rate arbitrage. It follows that r_rlS a+p+c. As there is no reason to suspect a systematic negative association between p and c, r_rUS in fact would provide a noisier signal on a than f-s.
39me implied departure from interest rate arbitrage may be due to transactions costs. There may also be measurement errors in that the reported data for f and s may not represent the true transaction values.
40me expected values were estimated using the procedure discussed in note 16. Because of the caveat discussed in note 18, unexpected rates of inflation and unemployment were also considered as additional variables in the regressions but these variables were not significant.
41me coefficients of the reaction function were stable betwen subperiods with and without the target policy, according to the F-test at the 5% level. 441n the semilog money demand function that we use, the long-run elasticity at r0 would equal a2 r0. From (15) (with 82 0), a2 = The value of the interest elasticity in the text is calculated using estimates of 12 and X from regression 3 in table 1 and letting r0 .097 (the average value of r over the period).
-34 -45Previous studies tend to find the long-run elasticity of money demand (defined as a positive value) considerably less than one. See, for example, Laidler (1977) .
461t is interesting to note, however, that under interest rate control, exchange rate management may not be inferior on grounds of money growth variability, since in the absence of such a policy, the differential between Canadian and U.S. interest rates might be greater leading to greater monetary variability. Note: MS represents the average of the current and the lagged value of the money stock. * indicates significance at 5%. See appendix for data and sources. aRepresents two-stage least squares estimates, using r1, r, r and D as instruments. 
